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Abstract
This paper performs a comparison of two well known approaches for mod-
elling R&D spillovers associated with investment in E-R&D, namely dAspremont-
Jacquemin and Kamien-Muller-Zang. We show that there is little qualitative dif-
ference between the models in terms of total surplus delivered when selecting the
optimal tax regime when there is pre-commitment under cooperative regimes in
which rms coordinate expenditures to maximize joint prots. However, under
non-cooperative regimes there is marked dierence, with the model of Kamien-
Muller-Zang leading to higher taxation rates when rms share information. Fur-
thermore, we argue that the Kamien-Muller-Zang model is of questionable validity
when modelling R&D on emissions reducing technology due to counter intuitive
results showing a positive relationhip between R&D spillovers and emissions taxes.
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11 Introduction
When an environmental economic policy, such as an emissions tax, is imposed on a mar-
ket, each rm operating in this market has two options, either to reduce its output or
to increase abatement activities by investing in activities such as R&D of emissions re-
ducing technology (Baumol and Oates (1998)). The current thinking on the issue is that
policies targeting research and development and the adoption and diusion of emissions
reducing technology oer a greater scope for achieving the objective of prolonged and
sustained reduction in emissions (e.g., Jae et al. (2003), Jung et al. (1996), Kneese and
Schultze (1975) and OECD (2010)). However, without the presence of some form of
environmental economic policy to internalize the cost of pollution, the incentives are not
sucient to promote R&D in emission reducing technology. Furthermore, as rst noted
by Arrow (1962), any type R&D will generate social benets that do not always accrue
to the investing rm. As noted in Griliches (1984, 1992) and Jae (1986, 1998), many
of the benets of R&D accrue to competing rms, downstream rms who purchase the
innovating rm's product and consumers.
This will be doubly so with emissions reducing technologies, because they provide two
types of spillover eects. The rst is an indirect spillover associated with the public good
aspect associated with the knowledge generated from research, as discussed extensively
in the literature on R&D, while the second eect emerges as a direct consequence of im-
plementing an emissions reducing technology targeted at rectifying a public bad. Both of
these spillover eects provide an incentive for other rms to free-ride and therefore under
invest in either abatement technology or abatement eort. Hence, this can inhibit the
amount of rm level spending on R&D. However, these two spillover eect can also be
positive when rms are allowed to coordinate through the use of horizontal agreements,
in this way the externalities associated with R&D and abatement activity can be inter-
nalized. Our paper examines this interplay between process-focused environmental R&D
(henceforth, E-R&D), abatement eort and environmental economic policy, specically
emissions taxes focused on rm production.
We will provide a comparison of two approaches to modelling spillovers associated with
1investment in E-R&D. The rst approach that has been used is based on the the seminal
paper of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) (henceforth, AJ), in this approach
spillovers occur in abatement eort and rms are able to free-ride from the abatement
eorts of other rms. This approach has been used to model E-R&D in the papers
by Scott (1996), Chiou and Hu (2001), Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (2002), Poyago-
Theotoky (2003) and Poyago-Theotoky (2007a, 2010) and Poyago-Theotoky (2007b).
The second approach is based on Kamien et al. (1992) (henceforth, KMZ), in this
approach spillovers occur as a consequence of rms free riding o other rms R&D eorts
and occur as a consequence of rms applying technology developed by other rms. Amir
(2000) has shown for cost reducing process R&D that the two models in general are
not equivalent and will only be equivalent if cost and informational associated spillovers
in the two models are negligible. When spillovers do exist, the AJ model exaggerates
the impact of cost reducing R&D, with the KMZ model viewed as being the better
model.
In our paper, we provide a comparison of these two approaches in the context of the
E-R&D model of Chiou and Hu (2001). The model presented in their paper assumes
that the marginal damages associated with pollution are constant for each rm. We show
that for this model, the KMZ model is not rich enough to convey the impact of free riding
on emissions reduction, largely because this type of free riding cannot be incorporated
into a model based on KMZ-style informational spillovers. As such the model is too
conservative in predicting interplay between environmental and innovation spillovers.
Hence, the AJ-style R&D spillover model could be argued as being more appropriate for
modelling E-R&D. We reach this conclusion after performing a comparison between the
AJ and KMZ formulations applied to the four cases explored in KMZ: non-cooperative
(N), non-cooperative RJV (NJ), cooperative RJV (CJ) and the research cartel (C).
We also correct an error in Chiou and Hu (2001), where AJ-style R&D spillovers are
incorrectly accounted for.
In Chiou and Hu (2001), where the author's inadvertently set the spillover parameter to
0, they claim that this is case N, where there is no cooperation on research, with the RJV
occuring when the spillover parameter is greater than 0. However, this is not the case.
2When the R&D spillover parameter is set to 0, there are no information externalities
generated from R&D. Under the R&D spillover model formulated in AJ and KMZ, the
spillover parameter is always greater than 0, with the RJV occuring when rms share
information completely so that the spillover parameter is set to 1. We then investigate
the role that an optimal tax policy plays in this model, something that was not considered
in Chiou and Hu (2001). In their paper, the environmental tax is exogenously dened; in
fact, it can be shown that the tax regime selected in Chiou and Hu (2001) is not optimal
for the parameters selected in that paper. However, it is important to consider what the
correct tax regime is as can be understood from the current on going debate on carbon
prices in Australia.
We therefore investigate what is the optimal second best emissions tax for the Chiou
and Hu model. We do this for when the government makes an a priori commitment
to a specic tax regime, before rms select E-R&D eort. This is consistent with the
ordering of strategic interaction as presented in Chiou and Hu (2001). We then provide a
comparison between the AJ and KMZ models of the non-cooperative and cooperative E-
R&D models. We show that there is little qualitative dierence between the AJ and KMZ
models in terms of total surplus delivered when selecting the optimal tax regime. This
is surprising when one considers the results presented in Amir (2000), which indicates
that there are tangible dierences between the KMZ and AJ models for cost reducing
process R&D. Our results therefore indicate that for the case of tax pre-commitment the
AJ model is the appropriate model to use when modelling E-R&D.
This paper is set out as follows: Section two sets out the model, explaining the dierences
between the AJ and KMZ style R&D spillovers in the Chiou and Hu model. Section three
provides the comparison of the four R&D cases as laid out in KMZ for the AJ model
of E-R&D as it was formulated in Chiou and Hu (2001). Section four then repeats this
analysis for the KMZ model of E-R&D, providing a comparison of the each of the four
R&D cases. Section ve presents a welfare theoretic comparison of the optimal uniform
second best emissions tax policy for this model for the case where the government pre-
commits to the tax regime. Section six concludes.
32 The Model
We will begin by formulating a generalization of the model set down in Chiou and Hu
(2001). As in Chiou and Hu (2001), we will consider the model of a Cournot duopoly
producing a homogenous good. The inverse demand function for the market is given
by
P(q1;q2) := a   Q; Q = q1 + q2;
where a is the demand intercept and Q is the aggregate amount supplied by both rms.
As is standard practice in the R&D spillovers literature, there are no xed costs of
production and the marginal cost of production is normalized to 0 without loss of gen-
erality. When each rm produces qi, they also emit pollution at the rate of  e per unit
of production. The cost of pollution is imposed on the rm by a linear emissions tax
t.
However, the prot function for rm i is given by
i = (P(qi;q i)   t( e   s(ri;r i;)))qi   c(ri); i = 1;2 (1)
where s(ri;r i;) are spillovers expressed as a function of rms' abatement technology
level and c(ri) denotes R&D costs associated with applying the abatement technology.
The parameter  in the spillover function denotes the degree with which each rm can
benet from their rival's research. We use a general R&D spillover function to capture
the possibility of either AJ or KMZ style R&D spillovers.
For both the AJ and KMZ R&D spillover models, we explore the following four scenarios
as set down in KMZ. Note that because, in the nal stage of the game, Cournot com-
petition always prevail, we will use the behavior of rms in the research stage game to
describe each of these scenarios:
1. Case N: Firms behave noncooperatively in choosing R&D levels, choosing neither
to coordinate on R&D expenditure nor share information. The N stands for non-
cooperative R&D.
42. Case C: Firms rms choose to coordinate R&D expenditure levels, by choosing
ri to maximize the sum of their prots 1 + 2. The C stands for cartelized (or
collusive) R&D.
3. Case CJ: Firms behave as in Case C, choosing ri to maximize their joint prots.
In addition, they also share information, so that the R&D spillover parameter  is
set equal to 1. The CJ stands for cartelized research joint venture.
4. Case NJ: Firms behave as in Case N, choosing ri separately. However, they share
information, so that the R&D spillover parameter  is set equal to 1. The NJ
stands for non-cartelized research joint research.
The other feature in this model, which is dierent from Chiou and Hu (2001), is the
role that the government has in selecting the emissions tax. We consider the situation
where there are two possible emissions tax policies that are open for the government.
In the rst policy option the government decides to pre-commit to an emissions tax
regime. In this model, the sequence of decisions is as follows: (1) the government rst
decides on emissions taxes; (2) rms then decide on their R&D expenditure depending
on the type of R&D organization that they have committed to; and (3) rms then choose
their output inorder to compete in the product market, which in turn gives the level of
emissions imposed on society.
Alternatively, the government does not precommit, but instead makes an interim decision
regarding the level of emissions taxes after rms have made their E-R&D decisions. In
this case the sequence of decisions will be made as follows: (1) in the rst stage each rm
will commit to a level of R&D investment, depending on the type of R&D organization
that they have committed to; (2) in the second stage, the government decides on its
tax policy; and (3) in the nal stage, rms will then engage in Cournot competition.
This paper will only examine the case where there is government pre-commitment to
emissions taxes. We do this to be consistent with the structure of the model in Chiou
and Hu (2001).
In that paper the decision structure was consistent with the ordering in the AJ model,
so rms rst choose their levle of cost reducing R&D expenditure and then decide on
5output in the product market. Altough taxes are included in Chiou and Hu (2001),
they are not optimal (as can be seen from our results in section four of this paper), as
they are modelled as an exogenous parameter. Under government precommitment to
tax, the ordering of decisions in our R&D model is therefore identical to Chiou and Hu
(2001), with the exception that in our model the government will not choose its taxes
to optimize total welfare. The non-precommitment case, will not be examined in this
paper; it has been examined elsewhere in Poyago-Theotoky (2007a, 2010), albeit for a
slightly dierent emissions structure.
The decision structure of our model is therefore ordered into three stages:
1. Stage 1: The government decides on emissions taxes , choosing the taxes in order
to maximize the welfare equation
W = CS + PS + T   D;
where CS denotes consumer surplus, PS denotes producer surplus, T denotes
aggregate revenues from emissions taxes and D denotes the social cost of environ-
mental damages.
2. Stage 2: Given the proposed tax regime t of the government and the level of R&D
spillover , rms choose their E-R&D expenditure xi based on whether they are
behaving non-cooperatively or whether they are participating in a research cartel
and coordinating their costs.
3. Stage 3: In the nal stage rms then engage in Cournot competition in the product
market, choosing their output qi accordingly. The production decisions made in
this market, in turn, determine the level of emissions imposed on society.
3 Cournot Market Stage Game
In this section we derive the equilibrium of the Cournot market stage game for both
the AJ and KMZ models. The results for the AJ - equilibrium outputs, prots and
6comparative statics - align with the results presented in Chiou and Hu (2001), with the
exception that there they assume that the R&D spillover term  2 [0;1), where  = 0
corresponds to the competitive case and 0 <  < 1 for RJVs. This is incorrect - the
R&D spillover term  2 (0;1], where  = 1 corresponds to the case where there is a RJV
and there is complete disclosure of information between the two rms.
The case when 0 <  < 1 corresponds to the non-competitive case, as can be seen from
AJ and KMZ, respectively. This is because the spillover parameter  establishes the
degree with which intellectual property rights are observed. When  = 0, intellectual
property rights are at their strongest and any form of imitation or patent versioning
is not tollerated under the law. When 0 <  < 1, this corresponds to the case where
rms are working non-cooperatively, but intellectual property rights are weaker and so
patent versioning and imitation are tolerated. When  = 1 there is full disclosure of
R&D, which corresponds to the case of a RJV where rms would share the rights to any
patentable technology.
The reader should note that in the analysis that follows, we use ~  and   to denote R&D
spillovers in the AJ and KMZ models. We use this notation because, as we will show,
the spillovers are not equivalent in the two models and act in dierent ways. Note that
 is being used in this section to denote a generic R&D spillover parameter.
3.1 The Linear Quadratic Model (AJ)
In this model, spillovers are regarded as leakages in technological know-how and take
place in nal outcomes. Hence each rms nal cost reduction is the sum of its au-
tonomously acquired part and a fraction (equal to the spillover parameter ) of all other
rms parts. If we consider the prot function as given by equation (1), the spillover





= ri + ~ rj; i;j = 1;2: (2)
7Hence each rm can reduce the level of their marginal emission rate  e, and in turn its
payments of emissions taxes, by applying a quantity ri of emissions reducing abatement
technology.
For the nal stage of the game, the ith rm's equilibrium prot function can be derived
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i; i;j = 1;2 (3)
The cost of producing this technology is given by c(ri) = r2
i=2 inorder to model the
eect that research costs are convex (i.e., to create greater emissions reduction, rms must
invest in better and more costly scientists and equipment). The spillover parameter ~ 
captures the degree with which it is possible for rm i to free ride o the technological
investments of the other rm, thereby reducing their expenditure on E-R&D.
The following two propositions can now be derived. Proposition 1 shows, that rm i's
pollution abatement R&D has two eects. Firstly, rm is pollution abatement R&D
lowers its per output emission tax payment and thus increases its output. Secondly, rm
is pollution abatement R&D spills over to the opponent, making the opponents emission
tax payments decrease (increase) and thus the opponents output increase (decrease)
depending on whether the spillover eect is less (greater) than 1/2.
Proposition 1 For any emission tax t, if spillovers parameter ~  > 1=2, then rm j
increasing its research will have a positive eect on rm i's output (and negative oth-
erwise); and for rm i increasing its own research always leads to higher output for all
~ .
Proof. The equilibrium output for each rm in the product market stage game may be
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Taking the rst partial derivatives of rm i's equilibrium output function qi with respect
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The strategic eect shown in Proposition 1 is important: If  < 1=2, then the rst eect
dominates the second eect and rm i's pollution abatement R&D makes its opponents
output decrease. If   1=2 the the opposite eect occurs so that rm is pollution
abatement R&D makes its opponents output increase. Hence, as shown in Proposition
2, below, as the spillover eect increases, the marginal eect of the abatement level on qi
decreases. This is because as the spillover eect increases, the opponents tax payments
will also decrease with rm is pollution abatement level.
Proposition 2 For any emission tax t, an increase in ~  will give a positive change in
output for xi  2xj (otherwise output will fall).






t(xi   2xj) > 0; i;j = 1;2
will be non-negative if xi  2xj and will be negative otherwise.
3.2 The KMZ Model
In this model, the rm can reduce their marginal rate of emissions  e, by investing the
amount yi in emissions reducing abatement technology. Hence, the cost of producing







2(yi +  yj)=: (4)
There is also a positive spillover eect from applying this technology, which is given by
 yj, 0     1. The purpose of this spillover parameter   is to capture the degree
to which it is possible for rm i to free ride o the technological investments of other
rms.
This is a dierent interpretation to that of the AJ model. Here, each rms nal (or
eective) R&D investment in emission reduction is the sum of its own (autonomous)
expenditure and a xed fraction (given by the spillover parameter) of the sum of other
rms expenditures. Hence, all spillovers are purely technological. As rst noted in Amir











i; i = 1;2;
allowing either payo function to be recovered from the other. Hence, when  = 0 the
AJ and KMZ models are equivalent. This explains the point made earlier regarding the
notational distinction being made in this paper, between these two spillover parame-
ters.
In the presence of spillovers, it can be seen by inspection that for the prot functions
given in equations (eq:prof-AJ) and (eq:prof-KMZ) that the above transformation would
not work, and no other transformation can be found. Hence, the two games are not
generally equivalent. The equilibrium prot for rm i, once again can be derived by


















yi +  yj
2
  yi; i;j = 1;2 (5)
We now require similar propositions to Propostion 1 and 2 of the previous subsection,
10to show what happens to the output of rm i, if levels of E-R&D expenditure yi and yj
change and if the spillover parameter  changes.
Proposition 3 For any emission tax t:
1. If the spillover parameter
  < 1=2
q
(yi +  yj)=(yj +  yi);
then rm j increasing its research will have a positive eect on rm i's output (and
negative otherwise).
2. For all levels of R&D spillover  , increasing research expenditure always leads to
higher output for rm i.
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Taking the rst partial derivatives of rm i's equilibrium output function qi with respect
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yj +  yi
We note that the conclusions are identical to the AJ model, if expenditures are identical
for each rm, so that yi = yj for all rms i;j.
Proposition 3 indicates that for the KMZ model, the same relationship will hold as in
AJ in that there are both direct and indirect eects on output depending on the size of
11the spillover parameter. The major dierence being that this depends on the relative
size of each rm's eective expenditure on E-R&D. This is made clear in the following
proposition.
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; 0 <   1;
otherwise output will fall.
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yj +  yi
; 0 <   1
and is negative otherwise.
One interesting consequence of Proposition 4, is that @qi=@  > 0 will hold if and only
if @qi=@yj > 0. This is a stronger result than what is implied under the AJ model, it
indicates that under the KMZ model the spillover from the other rm's investment in E-
R&D is crucial in determining whether or not the rm will be able to expand production.
It is therefore important to reemphasize that the dierences between the AJ and KMZ
formulations cannot be reconciled by the assumption of symmetric expenditures, as might
be suggested by the similarities between Propositions 1 and 3.
4 E-R&D Stage Game
In this section, we derive the E-R&D eort/expediture for the rms under cases N, NJ,
C and CJ as set down in KMZ. In addition we derive the optimal second best emissions
12tax regime for this market. We do this analytically for the AJ linear quadratic model and
the KMZ model in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. We provide a comparison between
these models. The purpose for doing this is to ask which of the two models is the most
appropriate one when modelling E-R&D. The other natural question we wish to answer,
when making this comparison, is whether or not it is possible to reconcile these two
models. That is, are there some parameter values for which the AJ and KMZ models
can be reconciled.
We note that Chiou and Hu (2001) also consider the four cases provided in KMZ for the
AJ linear quadratic model. However, the non-cooperative model (N) and the research
cartel (C) they consider assume the non-existence of spillovers (i.e.  = 0), while the
non-cooperative RJV (NJ) and RJV cartel (CJ) have positive R&D spillovers that are
less than 1. This is not correct, as the point of the R&D spillover models (AJ and KMZ)
is that there are always spillovers from R&D (positive and negative), these give a rm the
incentive to under invest in research. In the RJV, this coordination failure is corrected
and the spillover parameter is set to 1. This signies that under the RJV, participating
rms are sharing information. As such, cases NJ and CJ in Chiou and Hu correspond to
the N and C cases from AJ and KMZ. In actual fact, NJ and CJ occur when the spillover
parameter is set equal to one. In this section, we set out the AJ model following exactly
the formulation of each of the cases as provided in KMZ.
4.1 Linear-Quadratic Model (AJ)
Case N and NJ: We now nd the subgame perfect equilibrium (SGPE) of the E-R&D
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)t2 (6)
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1   (1 + )r
N
=
6(a   t e)[9 e   2(2   )(1 + )at]
(9   2(2   )(1 + )t2)
2 (8)
The necessary second order condition for the SGPE is 9 > 2(2   )2t2. The stability
condition on the Nash equilibrium is given
2(2   )(2   1)t
2 < 9   2(2   )
2t
2:
This is satised when  > 4=3, which also satises the second order condition.
The following proposition shows that in the AJ model, costs of R&D will go down as the
spillovers increase. This points to pivotal role that RJV have in the AJ model:
Proposition 5 Given the same emission tax rate and provided that rms engage in
Cournot output competition, increasing the spillover  has the eect of lowering R&D
eorts, for 0   < 1.
Proof. Dierentiating equation (eq: abatementN) and assuming that the second order
conditions hold, then
 2t(a   t e)
(9   2(2   )(1 + )t2)2[9   2(2   )
2t
2] < 0; 0   < 1:
Hence, as  increases the costs of abatement becomes smaller.
Not surprisingly we nd that when  = 1, which occurs when rms share research labs
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Cases C and CJ: Under the research cartel, both rms choose their abatement level





Then depending or whether or not rms are participating in an RJV,  is either set to
1 (Case CJ) or is left to be a positive value less than 1 (Case C).
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C
=
6(a   t e)[9 e   2t(1 + )(a + t e)]
9   2(1 + )2t2 ; (14)
The necessary second order condition for the existence of an equilibrium under a research
cartelization is 9 > 2(5   (8   5))t2.
Proposition 6 Given the same emission tax rate and provided that rms engage in
Cournot output competition, increasing the spillover  has the eect of lowering R&D
eorts, for 0   < 1.
Proof. Dierentiating equation (eq:abatementC) with respect to  and assuming that
15the second order conditions hold, then
2t(a    et)(9 + 2(1 + b)2t2)
(9   2(1 + b)2t2)2 > 0; 0   < 1:
This indicates that as  moves towards 1, abatement eorts will also increase.
When the RJV cartel is present, so that rms both coordinate abatement eorts and
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   8t2 ;
4.2 KMZ Model:
Cases N and NJ We now nd the SGPE equilibrium; this is found by deriving
the Nash equilibrium of the E-R&D stage game. Under the KMZ model, both rms
choose their level of expenditure in E-R&D yi to maximize their prot functions. The
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16These lead to the following total emissions
E
N =
2(a    et)(9   4(2   )t2)(9 e + 2t(2   )(a   2 et)
3(9   2(2   )t2)
(17)
The necessary second order condition is 9 > (2   )2t2.
The following proposition shows that in the KMZ model, costs of R&D will go down as
the spillovers increase. This points to privotal role that RJV have in this model.
Proposition 7 Given the same emission tax rate and provided that rms engage in
Cournot output competition, increasing the spillover  has the eect of lowering R&D
eorts, for 0   < 1.
Proof. Dierentiating equation (eq: abatementN) and assuming that the second order
conditions hold, then
 2t(a   t e)
(9   2(2   )(1 + )t2)2[9   2(2   )
2t
2] < 0; 0   < 1:
Hence, as  increases the costs of abatement becomes smaller.
Not surprisingly, we nd that when  = 1, which occurs when rms share research








2t2(a   t e)2
2(9   2t2)
2 (18)







(a    et)(9   4t2)
3(9   2t2)
(19)




 e   2r
NJ
=
2(a    et)(9   4t2)(9 e + 2t(a   2 et))
3(9   2t2)
(20)
17Cases C and CJ: Under the research cartel, both rms choose their investmet ex-
penditure yi inorder to maximize their joint prot function, then depending or whether
or not rms are participating in an RJV,  is either set to 1 (Case CJ) or is left to be a
positive value less than 1 (Case C). Solving this maximization problem for Case C, we







2t2(1 + )(a   t e)2
(9   2(1 + )t2)2 ; (21)







(a   t e)(9   4(1 + )t2)
3(9   2(1 + )t2)
; (22)
leading to the following total emissions under the research cartel:
E
C =
2(a    et)(9   4t2(1 + ))(9 e + 2t(a   2 et)(1 + ))
3(9   2t2(1 + )
(23)
The necessary second order condition for the existence of an equilibrium under a research
cartelization is 9 > 2(5   (8   5))t2.
The optimal levels of research expenditure for the RJV cartel (Case CJ) can now be







4t2(a   t e)2
(9   4t2)2 ; (24)







(a   t e)(9   8t2)
3(9   4t2)
; (25)
leading to the following total emissions under the RJV cartel:
E
CJ =
2(a    et)(9   8t2)(9 e + 4t(a   2 et))
3(9   4t2)
(26)
185 Optimal Emissions Taxes with Precommittment
In this section we derive the optimal emission tax policy for this market. As stated
earlier, we will assume that the government opts to make an ex ante commitment at
the beginning of the E-R&D to a particular emissions tax regime. Hence, in our paper
the government removes itself from being a strategic entity in determining the level of
E-R&D, as would be the case if the govenment decided for emissions taxes that were
time consistent (i.e. sub game perfect) and announced their tax policy in the second
stage of the game (after rms chose their E-R&D levels).
This is the natural starting point for a comparison between the results appearing here
in our paper and those in the paper by Chiou and Hu (2001), because the sequencing of
decisions is the same. The only dierence being that in Chiou and Hu the tax regime is
not optimal - they choose to nominate a tax regime rather than derive it by solving a
social welfare equation. Hence, R&D levels in their analysis are expressed as a function
of t. While they do conduct some analysis of what happens when the taxation rate is
changed, no results are given pertaining to the optimal level of emissions taxation.
In our paper, the government will select the optimal emissions tax regime by maximizing
total welfare (SW) with respect to the emissions tax rate t; hence emissions taxation
will be optimal in a second best sence, which is consistent with the welfare analysis of
R&D in Suzumura (1992). The social welfare equation is given as follows:
SW(t;;) = CS(t;;) + PS(t;;) + T(t;;)   D(t;;):
Here, consumer surplus CS = 1
2Q2, producer surplus PS = 1+2 and T is the aggregate
emissions tax revenue. Environmental damages D are assumed to be a function of the
total emission, D(E), with D(0) = 0;D0 > 0;D00 > 0 for E > 0. The quadratic function






where E = e1+e2 is the level of aggregate emission attributable to rms in this industry.
19It will be assumed that T = tE, where t 2 [0;1] is the tax rate. A common tax rate is
used because we will be focusing only on the symmetric equilibrium. The other aspect
to note is that the welfare equation must be solved numerically.
We choose the following parameter values that are permitted within the second order
conditions provided by both the AJ and KMZ models under all regimes: A = 20 and
 = 8. We do this because it allows us to compare not only the optimal tax rate, but also
maximum level of social welfare that this generates. The other parameter of importance
is  e, which must be less than or equal to 1 for both the AJ and KMZ models. The
reason that this must be so, is that  e is the parmater governing the marginal rate of
emissions by each of the rms. When  e > 1, the optimal rate of taxation is always to
set the emissions tax rate t = 1 and there is never any interaction or oset from the
E-R&D spillover term. This occurs across non-cooperative and cooperative regimes for
both the AJ and KMZ models. Hence, we avoid examining this case and instead focus
on  e  1, where the optimal tax rate t < 1 and interesting trade-os occur between t
and the respective spillover parameters used each model.
5.1 The Linear Quadratic Model (AJ)
Table 1 sets out the main components of the social welfare equation for the AJ model.
We include only aggregate emissions E in this table as damages D and the emissions
taxes T are functions of E and can be computed with little eort.











































Table 1: Components of the Social Welfare Equation for the AJ Model
20For the non-cooperative regimes we nd that when  e  1 and A = 20 and  = 8, that
the optimal rate of taxation occurs in the ranges from 0.4 to 0.6. Figure 1 provides an
example. The spillover eect in the AJ model has no impact on the level of taxation,
with the same tax rate being optimal across the entire spillover range. Hence, sharing
information has a neutral welfare eect in terms of increasing E-R&D and reducing
emissions. By comparison, emissions taxes look to be an eective means of encouraging
E-R&D and reducing emissions.
 
   
 
Figure 1: Impact of Taxes vs. Information Spillovers for Non Cooperative Regimes in
the AJ Model (A = 20; = 8,  e = 0:5)
By comparison, for the cooperative regimes (where rms participate in a research cartel
and choose R&D eort to maximize joint prots), we nd that there is a trade-o between
information spillovers and emissions taxes t. Figure 2 depicts one such relationship; the
contour plot shows the spillover parameter ~  when rms engage in the cartel. As a
consequence, tax rates are at their lowest when ~  = 1 and rms are engaging in a RJV
Cartel (i.e. when rms coordinate. In fact for parameter values A = 20,  = 8 and
 e = 0:5, when ~  = 1 the optimal tax rate t = 0:2, with the emissions tax rate t ! 1
when ~  ! 0.
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Figure 2: Impact of Taxes vs. Information Spillovers for Cooperative Regimes in the AJ
Model (A = 20; = 8,  e = 0:5)
5.2 KMZ Model
Table 2 (located at the end of the paper) sets out the main components of the social
welfare equation for the KMZ model. As for Table 1, we include only aggregate emissions
E in this table as damages D and the emissions taxes T are functions of E and can be
computed with little eort.
One interesting feature, which is true for both the non-cooperative and cooperative
regimes, is that both the AJ and KMZ report similar levels of aggreagate social welfare.
However, the relationship between the R&D spillover parameter and optimal emissions
tax rate are dierent when comparing the two models across both regimes. This can
be seen by comparing Figure 1 with Figure 3 and Figure 2 with Figure 4. The greatest
dierence is between the AJ and KMZ models under the non-cooperative regimes. The
surface plot shown in Figure 3 indicates that relationship between emissions taxes and
social welfare is similar to that shown in the AJ model.
However, the contour plot in Figure 3 shows that emissions taxes rate t and R&D
spillovers   in the KMZ have a positive relationship. This is counter intuitive. However,
22 
   
 
Figure 3: Impact of Taxes vs. Information Spillovers for Non Cooperative Regimes in
the KMZ Model (A = 20; = 8,  e = 0:5)
as shown in Proposition 3 there exists both a positive and negative relationship between
R&D spillovers and rm-level output in the KMZ model. A similar relationship exists in
the AJ model, as shown in Proposition 1; the positive relationship between the spillover
term and output may be a driver for the neutral eect in the AJ model. Similarly, if the
positive eect were large enough in the KMZ model, then this would lead to an increase
in output and therefore taxes would also be required to increase. This could give rise to
the positive relationship between taxes and R&D spillovers shown in the contour plot of
Figure 3.
For the cooperative regimes, Figure 4 shows a similar trade-o between   and t in the
KMZ model as the one that was shown in Figure 3 between ~  and t for the AJ model.
Once again, optimal tax rates are lowest (t = 0:5) when the E-R&D spillover parameter
  = 1 and highest (t = 1) when   = 0. Hence, for both models, Figures 2 and 4 illustrate
that policy makers have a range of options open to them if collaborative research in the
form of a research joint venture, where rms are able to share costs of R&D, is permitted.
For both the AJ and KMZ models, the degree of the environmental tax burden can be
reduced by increasing or decreasing degree with which collaborative rms can appropriate
23intellectual property rights from research where costs are shared.
 
   
 
Figure 4: Impact of Taxes vs. Information Spillovers for Cooperative Regimes in the
KMZ Model (A = 20; = 8,  e = 0:5)
The other point to note is that the scope of this trade-o between R&D spillovers and
taxes is greatly reduced under the KMZ model. The reason being that under the KMZ
model rms cannot free-ride o the emission eorts of other rms. This is not the case
in the AJ model, where R&D eort is assoicated directly with emissions reduction. As
such, rms in the AJ model can benet not only from the R&D eort of other rms, but
also by free-riding o the other rms' eorts to reduce emissions. This cannot occur in
the KMZ models because R&D spillovers are embedded within a function and the eect
of R&D on emissions is directly attributable to the rm that made the investment.
6 Conclusion
This paper performs a comparison of two approaches to modelling spillovers associated
with investment in E-R&D. The major conclusions of this paper can be summarized
as follows: We show that there is little qualitative dierence between the models in
terms of total surplus delivered, when selecting the optimal tax regime when there is
24pre-commitment under cooperative regimes in which rms coordinate expenditures to
maximize joint prots. However, under non-cooperative regimes there is marked dier-
ence, with the model of Kamien et al. (1992) leading to higher taxation rates when rms
share information.
This is surprising when one considers the results presented in Amir (2000) in the context
of cost reducing process R&D, where models based on the approach of d'Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) exaggerate the benets associated with process R&D. We show the
opposite result: that models based on Kamien et al. (1992) lead to over investment in
E-R&D, higher output and higher taxes. Furthmore results under the non-cooperative
regime for the KMZ model indicate that there is cause for concern regarding a counter
intuitive relationship between R&D spillovers and emissions tax rates. For this reason the
AJ model is seen to be better for modelling R&D on emission reducing technology.
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